As Emperor Taizong of the Tang Dynasty, Li Shimin, said, "Using a bronze mirror, one can adjust one's attire; using history as a mirror, one can understand the rise and fall of dynasties." In the current complex international economic situation, this saying takes on even deeper significance. Recently, the so - called "reciprocal tariff" trade war initiated by the Trump administration has drawn widespread attention. There are pessimistic views about the Chinese economy, the US economy, and even the world economy on the Internet, which will not be elaborated on here. However, Trump's attitude has gradually softened recently. A series of measures have indicated a possible easing of the trade war situation: On April 9th, Trump suddenly changed his stance and announced a 90 - day suspension of the so - called "reciprocal tariffs" for most countries. On April 10th, the Trump administration withdrew its plan to restrict NVIDIA from exporting the H20 artificial intelligence chip to China. On April 12th, the US Customs issued a new notice. Trump decided to exempt tariffs on smartphones, computers, and many electronic devices and components. From these changes, the author believes that the "reciprocal tariff" trade war of the Trump administration is likely to end up in a fizzle in the later stage. After all, this may just be a negotiation tactic of Trump, a businessman - turned - president who is obsessed with his so - called art of the deal. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that the US will not reduce tariffs on China in the future, but we don't need to panic excessively. Just as Emperor Taizong said, we can review the Sino - US trade war 1.0 in 2018, take the photovoltaic industry as an observation point, and use data to analyze the impact of the trade war on related industries and supply chains.
Looking back at the Sino - US trade war, the photovoltaic field was filled with smoke and paid a corresponding price. In terms of the total trade volume between China and the US, in 2018, the total Sino - US trade volume was 633.5 billion US dollars (data from the Chinese Customs). Among them, photovoltaic products accounted for 1.2% of China's exports to the US (about 7.4 billion US dollars). By 2024, the total trade volume dropped to 586.7 billion US dollars, a decrease of 7.4%. However, the proportion of photovoltaic products increased to 2.1% (about 12.3 billion US dollars), and the export structure has undergone a fundamental change. The proportion of direct supply from China to the US dropped from 70% in 2018 to 15% in 2024 (statistics from SEIA), while the proportion of transit through Southeast Asia to the US surged from 5% in 2018 to 55% in 2024 (import traceability data from the US Department of Commerce). It turns out that the US has been keeping a close eye on these data. In terms of the impact of tariffs on prices, before July 2018, the CIF price of Chinese - made photovoltaic modules in the US was \(0.25 per watt. After the implementation of tariffs, the price soared to \)0.34 per watt (including a 35% tariff), pushing up the price of domestic US modules by 42% year - on - year. US local producers did make a fortune for a while, but unfortunately, this good situation did not last long. After the substitution by Southeast Asia, in 2024, the CIF price of Southeast Asian - made modules was $0.28 per watt (including a 4.8% tariff), 18% lower than that of domestic US modules (SEIA cost analysis). Even with certain advantages given, the US - related industries still failed to win in the competition.
Facing the difficulties brought about by the trade war, Chinese photovoltaic enterprises successfully broke through in Southeast Asia, launching a data - driven survival game. In terms of production capacity transfer, from 2018 to 2024, the photovoltaic module production capacity in Southeast Asia expanded from 5GW to 45GW, accounting for 40% of the global total. Among them, Vietnam reached 20GW (Longi 8GW, JA Solar 6GW, Trina Solar 5GW), Thailand 12GW (JinkoSolar 6GW, Canadian Solar 4GW), and Malaysia 13GW (Longi 7GW, GCL - Poly 5GW). From the perspective of corporate financial performance, Longi Green Energy invested a total of 3.2 billion US dollars in Southeast Asia from 2019 to 2024 to build a vertically integrated base. In 2024, its exports to the US were 8.2GW, accounting for 37% of the company's total exports, an increase of 220% compared to 2018. The gross profit margin of the Southeast Asian base was 24.5%, much higher than 14.2% of direct supply from China (2024 financial report). The Thailand factory of JinkoSolar put into operation a 6GW N - type TOPCon production line in 2023, with 85% of the equipment being domestically produced in China. The tariff cost per watt decreased by \(0.08, and the product had a premium of \)0.05 due to technological efficiency advantages. In the second quarter of 2024, its shipments to the US increased by 65% month - on - month, accounting for 18% of the US residential market share (SEIA report). In terms of supply chain restructuring, in 2024, China's exports of photovoltaic equipment to Southeast Asia reached 3.8 billion US dollars, accounting for 25% of the global equipment exports. For example, Longi exported HJT equipment worth 800 million yuan per year to its Vietnam base. At the same time, 65% of the silicon materials for Southeast Asian factories came from China (General Administration of Customs data).
The trade war has had a profound impact on both China and the US. The US photovoltaic industry has fallen into a dilemma. From 2019 to 2022, the average annual growth rate of US photovoltaic installations was only 12%, lower than the global average of 25%. The market share of US manufacturers such as First Solar dropped from 18% in 2018 to 9% in 2024. Moreover, in 2024, more than 20,000 Chinese technical workers were employed in Southeast Asian photovoltaic factories (Vietnam Labor Department data), indicating that high - quality professional photovoltaic industry workers still rely on China. The Chinese photovoltaic industry has also paid a price during the upgrade process. The R & D investment proportion increased from 3% in 2018 to 6.2% in 2024, achieving some technological achievements. The mass - production HJT efficiency reached 25.4% (the highest in the world), and the laboratory efficiency of perovskite was 33.7%. At the same time, the degree of market diversification has increased. The dependence on exports to the US decreased from 30% to 15%, while the proportions of the EU, the Middle East, and Latin America increased to 25%, 18%, and 12% respectively. The global supply chain restructuring has also brought costs. The freight on the Southeast Asia - US route is 15% - 20% higher than that on the China - US route (Drewry Shipping Index). And due to the backward energy structure in Southeast Asia (coal - fired power accounts for 55% in Vietnam), the carbon footprint of components is 8% - 12% higher than that in China (BNEF carbon tracking report). After all these 折腾 by the US, the carbon footprint has increased significantly, and environmentalists will probably criticize it loudly.
Looking to the future, the game between China and the US in the photovoltaic industry is still ongoing, and data will define the new industrial order. In terms of tariff policies, in 2024, the IRA was revised to allow Southeast Asian factories to use no more than 60% of Chinese original components and still be eligible for subsidies. Chinese enterprises immediately adjusted their supply chain ratios. The US Department of Commerce also issued a warning that if the proportion of Chinese technology exports exceeds 70%, it will initiate an anti - circumvention investigation. Technological competition is also escalating. In 2024, the number of overseas patent applications by Chinese photovoltaic enterprises increased by 45% year - on - year. Longi's HJT patents cover 30 countries. The US plans to impose a carbon tariff on imported photovoltaic modules (expected to be implemented in 2025), and Chinese enterprises are accelerating their EPD certification. In terms of supply chain resilience, there are certain risks in Southeast Asia. For example, the 12% power shortage rate in Vietnam in 2023 pushed up manufacturing costs, and some enterprises returned to western China (such as Longi expanding its production capacity by 5GW in Yunnan), which once again proves the superiority and forward - looking nature of China's development model. At the same time, in 2024, the EU's photovoltaic production capacity reached 18GW (a year - on - year increase of 50%), and China's technology licensing revenue reached 1.2 billion US dollars.
The Sino - US trade war has reshaped the digital landscape of the photovoltaic industry. China has resolved the crisis through technological innovation and supply chain restructuring, while the US government's goal of bringing back manufacturing industries has failed. The legacy of this game is a more decentralized and technology - driven global photovoltaic ecosystem. China is re - defining the rules with data. For ordinary investors, it is necessary to closely monitor the trend of the trade war 2.0 and the progress of tariff negotiations between ASEAN, Mexico, and other major regions for China's transit trade and the US.
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